Gandhi and Mahaya Buddhism

Gandhi once said that the Buddha was the greatest teacher of ahimsa (non-violence) and that he "taught us to defy appearances and trust in the final triumph of Truth and Love." 1 Albert Schweitzer once said that "Gandhi continues what the Buddha began. In the Buddha the spirit of love sets itself the task of creating different spiritual conditions in the world; in Gandhi it undertakes to transform all worldly conditions." 2 Margaret Chatterjee maintains that Gandhi’s position most closely resembles Mahayana Buddhism.

This essay covers several topics related to Gandhi and Buddhism. The first section discusses nonviolence in Buddhism and how it differs from Jainism and how it is compatible with Gandhi’s view. The second section addresses the problems regarding Gandhi’s misconceptions about Buddhism. The third section explores the issue of self-suffering in the Buddha and in Gandhi. The fourth section discusses the issue of the Bodhisattva ideal and Gandhi’s status as the Mahatma. The fifth section offers a positive view of the Buddhist self in order to counteract the pervasive negative view that one generally encounters. Focusing on the thoroughly empirical method of Gandhi’s experiments in truth, the sixth section will suggest a constructive comparison with the Buddha’s famous claim that “those who know causation know the Dharma.” The seventh section will discuss the relationship between morality and beauty and show how this relates to a Buddhist-Gandhian virtue ethics. In the last section I argue that commentators who interpret Gandhi as a follower of Advaita Vedanta cannot do justice to his firm commitment to the individual and cannot make sense out of his political activism.

Key Words: Peace, Bodhisattva, Virtue, Non-violence, Truth, Buddhism, Ethics
Introduction:

Gandhi once said that the Buddha was the greatest teacher of *ahimsa* (non-violence) and that he "taught us to defy appearances and trust in the final triumph of Truth and Love."¹ Albert Schweitzer once said that "Gandhi continues what the Buddha began. In the Buddha the spirit of love sets itself the task of creating different spiritual conditions in the world; in Gandhi it undertakes to transform all worldly conditions."² Raghavan Iyer concurs: "Gandhi was, in fact, following in the footsteps of the Buddha in showing the connection between the service of suffering humanity and the process of self-purification"; and even more emphatically he speaks of "Gandhi’s profound reinterpretation of Hindu values in the light of the message of the Buddha," Observing that Gandhi establishes a middle path between Jain individualism and the Vedantist dissolution of the individual, Margaret Chatterjee maintains that Gandhi’s position most closely resembles Mahayana Buddhism. Chatterjee claims that one of Gandhi’s prayers has Buddhist overtones: "The goal of the devotee is seen as the relief of suffering humanity, not as personal release from bondage. The mood expressed is much closer to the Bodhisattva than to the arhat ideal."

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NONVIOLENCE IN BUDDHISM

As in Jainism, *ahimsa* is preeminent in Buddhist ethics. Not killing is the first of the Five Precepts, and this prohibition includes all sentient beings from insects to humans. Buddhists (except some Tantric sects) firmly reject the ritual sacrifice of animals, although many allow the eating of meat as long as Buddhists are not the butchers. (Jains criticize Buddhists for being complicit in this violence against animals.) Both Buddhist and Jain farmers can eliminate pests
who are destroying crops, but Buddhists perform atoning rites afterwards. While pacifism is the ideal, Buddhists and lay Jains may kill in self-defense. Unlike Jain ascetics, Buddhist monks have not only served as soldiers, but have raised and led armies, especially in Japan, Korea, and Tibet. Finally, in some Mahayana schools Bodhisattvas may kill persons who will, if not stopped, murder others in the future. Appealing to consequentialist arguments, Buddhists defend such "preemptive strikes": Bodhisattvas accrue merit that they then can bequeath to others, and the would-be murderers are saved from the horrors of Hell. Needless to say, Jains are scandalized by what they see as a crass rationalization of violence.

Many scholars have observed that the word *ahimsa* occurs only rarely in Buddhist scripture and commentary. Compared to the Jains, the Buddhists conceive of *ahimsa* as a positive virtue or, more precisely, an enabling virtue for higher virtues. Therefore, Buddhists usually speak of these other virtues rather than *ahimsa* itself. In S. Tachibana's *The Ethics of Buddhism* the word is used only once, and then only as one of seven Sanskrit words meaning benevolence or compassion. Nonviolence, however, comes out very clearly in Tachibana's formulation of the Buddhist categorical imperative: "We ought not to hurt mentally and physically our fellow creatures as well as our fellow men, but to love and protect them." The Jain formulation of *ahimsa* is almost always negative, while the Buddhist expression is almost exclusively positive.

Some of Gandhi's exceptions to *ahimsa* would appear extreme and unacceptable even to contemporary proponents of euthanasia. Gandhi proposed that a dying man must euthanize his handicapped child if he thought that no one would care for her. If his own son were suffering from rabies and there was no cure, then he should be euthanized. In both cases it is more important to relieve pain and preserve personal dignity than to follow lock-step the rule of nonviolence. This means that in many cases passive *ahimsa* is actually *himsa*. If a man who runs amuck and threatens to kill others, Gandhi insists that he must killed; furthermore, the killer should "be regarded a benevolent man." Gandhi once told a Jain friend that *ahimsa* was not absolute and that one should always be "capable of sacrificing nonviolence for the sake of truth." If one cannot be true to himself without defending himself and others, then violence may be necessary.

**GANDHI'S MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT BUDDHISM**

It was not until he reached England that Gandhi discovered the great religious classics of his own Indian tradition. He first read the *Bhagavad-gita* in Sir Edwin Arnold's translation, and he read with "even greater interest" Arnold's verse rendition of the Buddha's life and thought. Writing to a Burmese friend in 1919, Gandhi said that "when in 1890 or 1891, I became acquainted with the teaching of the Buddha, my eyes were opened to the limitless possibilities of nonviolence." Gandhi declared that he was proud of the accusation (lodged by his own son) that he was a closet Buddhist, and he claimed that Buddhism was to Hinduism as Protestantism was to Roman Catholicism "only in a much stronger light, in a much greater degree." This comment
represents a slight against Roman Catholicism, which currently has the most compassionate
and most understanding Christian mission in Asia. It also reveals Gandhi's mistaken belief that
Buddhism, along with Jainism, are simply reform movements within Hinduism.

Gandhi's persistence in believing that the Buddha was a theist is yet another instance in
which his own religious views clouded his understanding. Gandhi's argument that "the
Law (dharma) was God Himself" is true only in Mahayana Buddhism, where the cosmic
Buddha is called the dharmakya, literally, the Body of the Law. (Surendra Verma's suggestion
that Gandhi's idea that God is Law, as it is not a Hindu or Jain idea, must have come from
Buddhism is certainly worth serious consideration. The Buddha himself, however, did not
claim any transcendental or cosmic nature, and the deification of the Buddha came after his
death. Furthermore, Gandhi's insistence on the Buddha's theism is ironic given the fact that he
constantly wavered between personal theism and an impersonal pantheism, or even an
impersonal "truthism." After all, Gandhi is most famous for his proposition that "Truth [not a
supreme person] is God," a strategy partially designed to attract atheists to his cause. In any
case, the Buddha adopted the Jain-Sankhya-Yoga view of the relationship between humans and
gods. This view is neither theistic nor atheistic: the gods do indeed exist, but they, like all other
nonhuman beings, have to have human incarnations in order to reach Nirvana. Finally, although I
personally embrace Gandhi's theism, if the ethics of nonviolence is to have the most
comprehensive acceptance, a nontheistic form would obviously be more preferable.

Nirvana is, in a word, freedom--freedom not only from hate and greed, but freedom from
craving, the unquenchable desire for those things that we can never attain. One significant
assumption of the Buddha's position is that ordinary desires, even for the Enlightened One, are
acceptable. This is the clearest mode of understanding the Buddha's Middle Way between
extreme asceticism on the one hand and sensualism on the other. It is also a good way to see
Buddhism as a religious humanism accessible to all people.

**GANDHI, SELF-SUFFERING, AND THE BUDDHA**

A typical Gandhian response to the misdeeds of others was to shame them completely by
doing their penance for them. This proved to be very effective not only against the British but
with his own family and followers as well. It is most intriguing to see how Gandhi has imposed
his own principle of self-suffering on the life of the Buddha. Although not used by the Buddha
or his immediate disciples, civil protest through acts of self-immolation has been common in
ancient as well as modern Asia. (Buddhist monks burning themselves to death during the
Vietnam War and Falun Gong suicides in China are the most recent examples.) Gandhi was of
course aware of this tradition of self-immolation, but he still believed that his own particular
adaptation of yogic tapas was new with him and that his practice of it had not yet been
perfected. Presumably he would have seen protests through self-immolation as still too passive
as compared to the engaged and dynamic nature of his own satyagrahas. (The Vietnamese
monks, as far as I can remember, were not actively engaged in dialogue with the American
officials.) Some commentators contend that there are instructive parallels between Gandhi’s self-suffering and the suffering of the Bodhisattva, and we shall assess this claim in the next section.

If Gandhi does conceive of self-suffering as doing penance for others, then he has gone far beyond the traditional view of tapas. Indeed, it may even be at odds with the law of karma, which holds that karma is always individual not collective. (This means that only the individual person can work off her karmic debt.) Gandhi, however, appears to believe in collective guilt: “If we are all sons of the same God and partake of the same divine essence, we must partake of the sin of every person.”

He once observed that the "impurity of my associates is but the manifestation of the hidden wrong in me," so this does appear to focus on individual karma, but his position is still equivocal and problematic. Margaret Chatterjee finds Gandhi's position very implausible, for, in the two cases she mentions, it is very difficult to see any "strict causal line[s]" between the actions of others and any implication of guilt on Gandhi's part. By seeing tapasya as a process of self-purification rather than doing penance for other people, one can make better sense of Gandhi's actions. In this light Gandhi would have said that he could not demand perfection in others as long as he found imperfection in himself.

THE MAHATMA AND THE BODHISATTVA

A critic might say that the most significant difference between the Buddha and Gandhi was that the Buddha was a world-denying ascetic and that Gandhi was not. The following passage sums up this view very nicely:

Outwardly it would be hard to conceive of two individuals more different. On the one hand is the tranquil Buddha who walks serenely and calmly across the pages of history, or traditionally sits peacefully on a lotus with a gentle smile of infinitive compassion. . . . On the other hand is the Mahatma, speed and energy in every movement, laughing and sorrowing in his ceaseless endeavour to help mankind with the problems of human life. . . .

Gandhi must have heard similar comments, because he formulated this own firm response: "The Buddha fearlessly carried the war into the adversary's camp and brought down on its knees an arrogant priesthood. [He was] for intensely direct action." Who is correct? The truth as usual lies somewhere in between. Although he did frequently confront brahmin priests (the scriptures report that they were almost always converted), it can hardly be said that the Buddha destroyed the Vedic priesthood. (It continues to have great power even today.) Furthermore, although Buddhism and Jainism can take much credit for the reduction of animal sacrifice, it still continues today as an integral part of Goddess worship in Northeast India and Nepal. And even Gandhi admits that because of India's own weaknesses, the Buddha's, as well as the Jains', message of universal tolerance and nonviolence failed miserably. (Much blame, according to Gandhi, must be laid at the feet of Shankara for his "unspeakable cruelty in banishing Buddhism [from] India." Finally, Gandhi is making the Buddha more of a political activist than he ever was. Gandhi should take sole credit for his own brilliant synthesis of religion and political
action. As one commentator has said: “One cannot picture the Buddha training his disciples to face lathi charges as did the Mahatma.”

The spiritual transformation of the entire world is the goal of most schools of Mahayana Buddhism. As opposed to the ascetic ideal of early Buddhism, where the emphasis was on personal liberation, the focus in Mahayana schools is on universal salvation. The vow of the Bodhisattva should be well known to those who know Buddhism: the Bodhisattva, even though she is free of karmic debt, vows not to enter Nirvana until all sentient beings enter before her. (The Bodhisattva's extra sacrifice caused some perceptive Buddhists to ask whether that made Bodhisattvas superior to the Buddha himself, who of course did not wait for the others.) The Bodhisattva ideal and the comprehensive range of universal salvation makes it relevant to contemporary debates about animal rights and the protection of the environment.

Gandhi does claim to have suffered--his fasts were long and many--for the good of all (sarvodaya); and he did declare that in his next life he wanted to be reborn an untouchable; but this still does not constitute anything like the soteriology that we find in Buddhism and Christianity. Gandhi obviously did not claim to have taken away the sins of the world as Buddhist and Christians claim their saviors do.

THE DYNAMIC SELF IN THE BUDDHA AND GANDHI

Siddhartha Gautama's response to the axial discovery of the self was strikingly unique: he proposed the doctrine of no-self (anatman). This conceptual innovation was so provocative that it was bound to invite misinterpretation, and unfounded charges of Buddhist "nihilism" continue even to this day. Gautama anticipated Hume's view that the self is the ensemble of feelings, perceptions, dispositions, and awareness that is the center for agency and moral responsibility. The Buddha's view, however, is superior to Hume's, primarily because Gautama supported real causal efficacy among internally related phenomena. While Hume deconstructed any theory of causality, the Buddha reconstructed causal relations with his theory of interdependent coorigination.

Gautama rejected the soul-as-spiritual-substance view of the Upanishads, Jainism, and Sankhya-Yoga, and he deconstructed the "spectator" self of these philosophies 2,500 years before recent thinkers dismantled the Cartesian self. As opposed to strict deconstruction, for example, Buddhists hold that selves, though neither the same nor different throughout their lives, are nevertheless responsible for their actions. These selves are also real in the sense that they are constituted by relations with their bodies, other selves, and all other entities. This is why the Buddhist self should be viewed in relational or process terms rather than the negative implications of the no-self doctrine. The Buddhist self is relational primarily in the sense of its dependence on the five skandhas and the internal relations this dependence entails. From this analysis we can clearly see that the Buddhist self is a robust personal agent full capable of maintaining its personal integrity and taking full responsibility for its actions.
GANDHIAN AND BUDDHIST EXPERIMENTS IN TRUTH

The Buddha's famous statement "a person who sees causation, sees the Dharma" implies that people know how to act, not because of abstract rules or absolutes, but because of their past and immediate circumstances. Those who are mindful of who they are and how they relate to themselves and others will know what to do. The "mirror of Dharma" should not be seen as a common one that we all look into together, as some Mahayana schools believe, but it is actually a myriad of mirrors reflecting individual histories. Maintaining the essential link between fact and value, just as Greek virtue ethics did, the Buddha holds that the truth about our causal relations dictates the good that we ought to do.

The Buddha's Middle Way is a distinctively personal mean between extremes, much like Aristotle's relative mean. Aristotle defined a moral virtue as "a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a mean, i.e. the mean relative to us, this being determined by [practical reason]." For example, Aristotle thought it was always wrong to eat too much, but each person will find his/her own relative mean between eating too much and eating too little. A virtue ethics of moderation is still normative, because the principal determinants in finding a workable mean for eating are objective not subjective. If people ignore these objective factors--e.g., body size, metabolism, and other physiological factors--then their bodies, sooner or later, will tell them that they are out of their respective means.

If this analysis is correct, then the traditional translation of the moral imperatives of the Buddha's eight-fold path may be misleading. Translating the Sanskrit stem samyag- that appears in each of the words as the "right" thing to do makes them sound like eight commands of duty ethics. Instead of eight universal rules for living, they should be seen as virtues, i.e., dispositions to act in certain ways under certain conditions and personal circumstances. Both are equally virtuous, because they have personally chosen the virtues as means, means relative to them.

GANDHI AND THE BUDDHA: THE AESTHETICS OF VIRTUE

Drawing on the tradition of Greek virtue ethics, one could define ethics as the art of making the soul great and noble. (Here the meaning of art would be the idea of creating a unique individual piece rather than making copies from a mould as in craft art.) It was Confucius who conceived of moral development as similar to the manufacture of a precious stone. At birth we are like uncut gems, and we have an obligation to carve and polish our potential in the most unique and beautiful ways possible. Gandhi appears to agree with this view: "Purity of life is the highest and truest art" and "Life must immensely excel all the parts put together. To me the greatest artist is surely he who lives the finest life."25

If are to speak of a Gandhian or a Buddhist virtue ethics, at least two major differences must be noted vis-à-vis the Greek tradition. First, for both Gandhi and the Buddha pride is a vice, so the humble soul is to be preferred over Aristotle's "great soul" (megalopsychia). (Aristotle's megalopsychia may even be too close to megalomania for the comfort of most
contemporary persons.) Second, neither Gandhi nor the Buddha would have accepted Aristotle's elitism. For Aristotle only a certain class of people (free-born Greek males, to be exact) could establish the virtues and attain the good life. In stark contrast, the Dharmakaya and Gandhi's village republic contain all people, including the poor, the outcast, people of color, and women.

UNITY IN DIVERSITY: GANDHIAN AND BUDDHIST HUMANISM

It is common to interpret Gandhi in terms of Vedanta philosophy, especially Advaita Vedanta, the most dominant school. Gandhi's several references to a quality less absolute and two equivocal affirmations of the principle of advaita offer some support for this view.26 The Advaitin interpretation offers a solution to the basic puzzle about Gandhi's self-suffering, which I have mentioned above. The principle of non-dualism allows Gandhi to see the sin of the other as his own sin, because in reality there is no distinction between him and others, between the "I" and the "Thou."

The problems of consistently maintaining an Advaitin Gandhi manifest themselves most clearly in Bhikhu Parekh's otherwise excellent book on Gandhi's political philosophy.27 After summarizing basic Indian philosophy he claims that Gandhi, just like Shankara, envisioned a two-tiered religion of a personal theism focusing on Shiva, Vishnu, Devi and an impersonal monism of Atman-Brahman. People in the second tier would recognize the illusion of individual self and consciousness, would eventually put the phenomenal world behind them, and would move from the worship of individual deities to experience the total unity of Atman-Brahman. Gandhi must object already at this point, because he wavered between personal theism and impersonal monism and never claimed that one was superior to the other.

There is sufficient evidence to call Gandhi a pantheist, but many commentators are not careful enough to distinguish between pantheism, where the cosmos and its parts are both real and divine, and the Advaitin position where only Atman-Brahman is real. John White has suggested,28 echoing medieval Jain arguments, that there is a basic inconsistency in Advaita Vedanta, because from the standpoint of the unliberated souls both Atman-Brahman and the phenomenal world exists, albeit the latter only in a derivative and temporal mode, whereas from that standpoint of the liberated souls the world does not exist. The Advaitin is not even consistently non-dualistic, because, until all humans are liberated, the Advaitin position is, as White calls it, a "transcendental dualism," a dualism of divine reality and derivative phenomena roughly equivalent to Christian theology. The principal difference is that God creates the world in Christianity whereas it is the creation of ignorance in Advaita Vedanta.

Daisaku Ikeda, the philosophical leader of the Soka Gakkei, paraphrases the medieval monk Nichiren Daishonin as saying: "The Buddha is an ordinary human being; ordinary human beings are the Buddha."29 There are two interpretations of the second phrase depending upon whether one follows early Buddhist texts or embraces later Mahayanist views. From the standpoint of early Buddhism to say that we are all Buddhas simply means that all of us have the potential to understand the Four Noble Truths and to overcome craving in our lives. The
Mahayanist interpretation would be that we all possess a Buddha-nature metaphysically equivalent to the Dharmakaya, the cosmic "body" of the Buddha. Given his commitment to a general Vedantist concept of soul, Gandhi would have felt very comfortable with the Mahayanist position, particularly since it respects diversity within unity and supports a dynamic and engaged concept of self. I therefore conclude that Buddhist humanism—a humanism of nonviolence and compassion—may be the very best way to take Gandhi’s philosophy into the 21st Century.

ENDNOTES

5. Gandhi, Young India 8 (November 18, 1926), p. 395.
12. See Harijan 8 (September 8, 1940), p. 277, where there is a long discussion of tapasya.
14. Gandhi, Young India 13 (October 29, 1931), p. 325-34.
18. Gandhi, Young India 2 (December 5, 1920); Selections from Gandhi, p. 159.
22. For the best comparative studies of the Buddha and Hume, see L. Stafford Betty, "The Buddhist-Humean Parallels: Postmortem,” Philosophy East and West 21:3 (July, 1971), pp. 237-


26. “God, ourselves and all objects in the universe are in essence one reality. Even God vanishes and we have only neti, neti” (*Collected Works*, vol. 32, p. 218). By also affirming *dvaita* (i.e., dualism), Gandhi is being more than equivocal. See his speech at Tanjore on September 16, 1927 in *Collected Works*, vol. 35, p. 1. Also feeling "one with God" is "the principle of *advaita*" is not its technical meaning in Shankara. See letter to Chi. Maganlal (May 18, 1918) in Iyer, *The Moral and Political Writings* (London: Oxford University Press, 1986), vol. 2, p. 290. Gandhi's statement that "the sum total of life is God" (*Harijan* 12 [February 15, 1948], p. 33) is definitely not the Advaitin position.

